The Russian Flag on Golan Hights

In the Middle East, the scene of the clash between Iran and Israel, a new development stands out: the Russian flag flies over the Golan Heights. Since the beginning of the year, the armed forces of Moscow have established at least three different military bases and 14 observation points on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights, bordering Israel. Meanwhile, Russian police units have begun operating regularly in the provinces of Quneitra and Daraa, immediately adjacent to the border. This marks the first time since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 that such a high number of Russian soldiers and equipment are positioned on the opposite side of the border, underscoring the increasing Russian presence in the region.

Russian forces have been present in Syria since September 2015 when President Vladimir Putin sent them to support the regime of Bashar Assad, which was on the brink of being overwhelmed by the civil war. Since then, they have expanded their presence on the ground, particularly strengthening the bases of Latakia and Tartus on the Mediterranean coast. However, this is the first time they have settled only a few hundred meters from the Israeli lines on the Heights that Damascus lost in the 1967 war, were the battleground for the 1973 war, and were annexed by Israel in 1981, becoming one of the most fortified regions – from both sides of the border – in the Middle East.

Specifically, Russia is multiplying the establishment of observation posts in the most strategic locations: from Bir al-Ajam to Al-Maalaka, always to the west of Quneitra, from where the view of the Israeli side is wider.

Hence the question arises as to why the Kremlin has decided to establish its own bases and, at the same time, start building fortifications that could potentially become a kind of armed barrier between Russia and Israel. The only known precedent of a land military line under Russian control in the Mediterranean region, after the end of the Cold War, is the one built between 2021 and 2022 to divide Cyrenaica from Tripolitania in Libya, in order to protect the stability of General Khalifa Haftar's militias control over Benghazi. However, at that time, the operation was carried out by mercenaries from the Wagner Brigade, whereas on this occasion, it is the actual Russian armed forces responding to the Kremlin's Defense.

They are acting with deliberate visibility: moving military vehicles, constructing installations, raising the flag, playing the national anthem, and manning bunkers, old and new, from which they clearly observe the Israeli civilian centers in front of them. In short, they are doing everything to attract attention, as was the case with the outposts of the European empires.

The question about what is happening is legitimate because, on the one hand, Moscow has no need to strengthen control over Syria, which it already holds - with the full consent of the Bashar Assad regime - and on the other hand, there is no bilateral military tension with Israel capable of justifying such a ground move.

So, what is Moscow doing? In the absence of official explanations from the Kremlin, more Western sources observing the situation on the Golan Heights claim that Moscow's decision would be the litmus test of the overlap between conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East.

The reason is that the increasing intensity of Israeli military activity along the borders with Lebanon and Syria, due to daily clashes with Hezbollah and other pro-Iranian militias, further intensified after the Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel, allows the Russians to easily observe up close the offensive and defensive functioning of American weapons that the Jewish state possesses and that the Russians believe are often very similar to those the Pentagon has been supplying to Volodymir Zelensky's troops for over two years.

Russian attention is mainly focused on drones, missiles, and anti-aircraft defenses. In other words, Moscow believes that gathering information on Israeli military operations against Hezbollah and the IRGC could help its troops better understand the American weapons they are dealing with in the skies over Ukraine. Russian military bases, strongholds, and observation points on the Golan Heights would therefore serve a very sophisticated intelligence operation aimed at deeply understanding how a range of American weapons operate in the theater of combat.

What strikes about this scenario is the analogy with what the US forces did during the Cold War in the Middle East - but in reverse - leveraging the Arab-Israeli conflicts to closely study the Russian weapons provided by the Kremlin to Damascus and Cairo. Back then, it mainly involved tanks, MiG aircraft, Soviet radar, and anti-missile batteries, from which the Pentagon did learn many secrets through the alliance with Israel. Now, Moscow's interest is focused on the American-made Israeli drones because Kiev increasingly employs them to target adversaries both in Ukraine and within Russian territory.

From this arises the consideration that the Kremlin is operating within the framework of the Middle Eastern conflict, which began over six months ago with Hamas' attack on Israel, not only to strengthen the strategic alliance with Tehran, support jihadist groups to bolster its position in the region, and divert American resources from supporting Ukraine but also to gather crucial information to militarily outmaneuver Zelensky's forces. By demonstrating an increasingly integrated strategic approach toward the larger Mediterranean region, viewing it as a single vast battleground in confrontation with the US and its allies - Ukraine and Israel.

In this context, it is interesting to note how a recent Israeli airstrike on IRGC targets in the city of Aleppo, resulting in unusually high Iranian and Syrian military casualties, showcased Jerusalem's ability to breach the most heavily defended airspace by Russian systems - due to the proximity to the bases in Tartus and Latakia. This suggests that Moscow may be studying this vulnerability in light of its implications for the Ukrainian scenario.

Adding further complexity is the undeclared cooperation between Russian and Israeli forces, in place since 2015, in the Syrian theater. Under this arrangement, Jerusalem does not hinder Moscow's activities supporting Assad, and in turn, Moscow does not impede Jerusalem's actions against Hezbollah and other pro-Iranian forces.

When we consider that the Islamic Republic of Iran is the primary supplier of armed drones to Russia in the Ukrainian theater, a highly intricate military scenario emerges. Moscow finds itself simultaneously safeguarding Assad's power in Damascus, acting as a military ally to Tehran, politically supporting Hamas, and abiding by tacit operational agreements with Jerusalem in Syria, while also monitoring Israeli activities to gain an edge against Ukraine.

In short, the situation portrays a complex military landscape where multiple alliances and rivalries intersect in the pursuit of diverse strategic interests.